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Louisiana’s political renaissance began in the 
year 1877 when the government of the state 
was restored to the hands of the white people 
– the intelligent and property holding classes. 
    — Louisiana Governor Newton C. Blanchard 
 
 
1 
 
In August 1904, Louisiana Governor Newton C. Blanchard 
declared that September 14 of that year would be celebrated as 
Louisiana Day at the St. Louis World’s Fair.1  The Louisiana 
Purchase Exposition, as that year’s fair was titled, celebrated the 
centennial of the 1803 treaty with France that brought the large 
Louisiana Territories to the United States.  More recent territorial 
gains were implicated in the theme.  For some, the Louisiana 
Purchase justified the imposition of U.S. rule on the Philippines, 
Puerto Rico, and Cuba following the 1898 Spanish-American War.  
As the country debated whether the United States should practice 
the Old World politics of empire, the celebration of the Louisiana 
Purchase commented on expansion into the Pacific.  Manifest 
Destiny had not yet been completed.  The Fair staged debates over 
racial biology and eugenics, while displaying members of Filipino 
and Native American tribes in specially built simulations of their 
“native” habitat.  The organizers carefully intertwined imperialism, 
white supremacy, and voyeurism for the visiting public.2 
 
 
2 
 
The context could not have been better for a newly elected 
governor who had fought for white supremacy in his state.  But 
Governor Blanchard had very specific reasons for choosing 
September 14, a “day justly memorable in [Louisiana’s] annals,” as 
Louisiana Day.3  On that day in 1874, the White League stormed 
and took control of the Louisiana state government buildings in 
New Orleans.  This white supremacist paramilitary organization 
had links to the Democratic Party.  It ousted the Republican 
administration, whose legitimacy the League did not concede.  The 
outcome of the 1872 election, which had again given Republicans 
control of the state, had been contested by the Democrats.  They 
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continued to feel that the election had been stolen from them.  The 
League set up its own government, [controlled] by Democrats. 
 
3 
 
President Grant refused to recognize these Democrats.  He sent 
U.S. troops against them, and they surrendered before there was 
any fighting.  Still, as the New Orleans Daily Picayune reminded 
its readers in 1904, Democrats saw the day as the “anniversary of 
the new birth of Louisiana from the terrible tyranny, darkness and 
misery imposed upon the State by the infamous Reconstruction 
acts of a sectional Congress.”4  What Democratic Governor 
Blanchard wanted to commemorate in St. Louis was this truncated 
history, focused on the overthrow of the interracial regime of the 
Republican Party, along with the eventual establishment of white 
rule and segregation.  In this and other instances, Governor 
Blanchard sought to construct a historical narrative that would 
shape the political memory of white Louisianans to constitute the 
identity of the state and those it sought to represent. 
 
 
4 
 
To interpret the resonances of Blanchard’s 1904 proclamation can 
be relatively straightforward in light of the relevant historical 
background.  Realists might consider this shaping of political 
memory to be an incidental or peripheral aspect of power.  They 
might emphasize the violence used to gain power or the legal 
mechanisms that white Democrats used to maintain it.  I argue 
instead that this case show[s] symbols to be central aspects of state 
power.  Events like Louisiana Day play what Antonio Gramsci calls 
an “educative” role.  They are devices for people in power to 
produce a “‘spontaneous’ consent” of the citizenry to their rule. 
 
 
5 
 
Two concerns intertwine here.  One is the familiar idea that the 
meanings of historical events become contested in political 
struggles.  Edmund Burke and the English radicals fought over the 
meaning of the Glorious Revolution in England; Israelis and 
Palestinians sift archaeological data for ways to legitimize their 
claims; nationalists in the Balkans trot out famous battles of the 
past to the same end.  The list could expand without end.  A 
second, closely connected question is how these contests help 
constitute the identities of the participants.  What processes occur? 
 
 
6 
 
To answer the two concerns together, I turn also to the work of 
Russian semiotician Yuri Lotman.  In his Universe of the Mind, 
Lotman explored the ways some forms of communication actively 
restructure social and personal identities.  Working toward a 
model for the transmission and generation of meaning in cultures, 
Lotman specified mechanisms for restructuring identities.  I show 
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that his concept of auto-communication allows us to see that some 
communication does not operate primarily to transmit 
information or persuade others.  Instead it forms an internal 
dialogue that shapes the identity of the self.  Combining insights 
from Lotman and Gramsci, I explain how Blanchard’s politics for 
state history contribute to politics of personal identity. 
 
 
 Hegemony  
 
7 
 
Let us begin with Gramsci.  Antonio Gramsci’s central contribution 
to political theory, and specifically Marxist theory, was his 
development of the concept of “hegemony.”  Jailed by the Fascist 
government in Italy in the late 1920s, Gramsci would die six days 
after the expiration of his prison sentence in April, 1937.  In prison, 
he set himself a course of study, producing the Prison Notebooks 
that represent the bulk of his published writings.  The topics 
covered in the Notebooks are extremely wide-ranging:  from 
linguistics, to reflections on Machiavelli’s Prince, to considerations 
of Fordist production methods in America.  Most influential, 
perhaps, are his sustained attempts to combat the reductionist 
“Economism” then dominant in strands of Marxism.  In this 
context, Gramsci centered his analysis on the relation between the 
state and civil society, especially the mechanisms by which the 
ruling class secures the consent of the ruled to its control of the 
state. 
 
 
8 
 
Gramsci identifies two different aspects of this task of securing 
consent:  leadership and education.  Leadership can be exercised 
by hegemonic groups within the broader civil society or state and 
among various subaltern groups.  As Jeremy Lester points out, 
hegemony is not a negative concept for Gramsci.  It is sought even 
by communists and the working class.5  Indeed one subaltern 
group tends to exercise hegemony over the others, educating them 
to share its sense of the struggle.  Thus hegemony implies the 
ability of some groups to lead others:  to win their consent, 
organize them, and direct them.  As “subaltern” suggests, military 
metaphors run throughout Gramsci’s account.  Yet the insight 
crucial to the concept of hegemony is that all leadership depends 
on the “‘spontaneous’ consent” of the led.6  Hegemony is an 
achievement separable from the simple exercise of force.7 
 
 
9 
 
As has been recognized at least since Machiavelli, the coercive 
apparatus of the state is a crucial prize in political struggles.  
Central to the modern state is, in Max Weber’s formulation, its 
“monopoly of legitimate physical violence.”8  For our purposes, the 
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key word is “legitimate.”  Sheer control of the state’s apparatus of 
coercion, its devices for securing “domination,” is insufficient; the 
control must also be seen as legitimate.  Gramsci’s hegemony is 
what the ruling class achieves when it can secure popular consent 
for the state’s use of coercion. 
 
10 
 
An episode from the life and times of Governor Blanchard can 
illustrate the point.  In the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, lynching of people of African descent became endemic 
across the South.  State authorities did little to prevent lynching 
and perhaps facilitated it on occasion.  Still the practice 
undermined the state’s monopoly on the legitimate means of 
violence, impugning the authority of the state government.  
Blanchard was committed to reasserting the state’s prerogatives, at 
least symbolically.  Early in 1906 in a northern parish of the state, 
a black man was tried for murder.  The outcome appeared a 
forgone conclusion, and the accused was convicted and sentenced 
to death.  The political crisis faced by Blanchard revolved around 
the state’s need to carry out the process.  Blanchard traveled to the 
trial to prevent the man from being lynched by local white people.  
His personal presence ensured that the convict was not lynched 
within the three days required by law to intervene between the 
sentencing and the execution. 
 
 
11 
 
At issue was not whether the man was guilty or whether he would 
die but whether the state would control the situation.  If the death 
sentence had been carried out by a mob, the legitimacy of the court 
process and the privilege of the state in the exercise of punishment 
would have been diminished.  Blanchard thought the matter great 
enough to travel the entire length of the state to attend 
proceedings in a local court.  His purpose was not merely to coerce 
the local populace into compliance but also to show that the state 
would mete out “justice” as it saw fit.  Above and beyond the racial 
politics of such trials, Blanchard’s dramatic action attempted to 
maintain the hegemony of the constellation of forces that had 
assumed the mantle of white supremacy and exercised state power 
in its name.9 
 
 
12 
 
This example also spotlights the “educative” function of the state.  
For Gramsci, law is a solution to the “‘juridical problem,’ i.e., the 
problem of assimilating the entire grouping to its most advanced 
fraction.”  The principal aim of law is less punishment or justice 
than education:  “it is a problem of education of the masses, of 
their ‘adaptation’ in accordance with the requirement of the goal to 
be achieved.  This is precisely the function of law in the State and 
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society; through ‘law’ the State renders the ruling group 
‘homogenous,’ and tends to create a social conformism which is 
useful to the ruling group’s line of development.”10 
 
13 
 
Many laws and court cases from the 1890s into the early twentieth 
century in Louisiana, as well as the reframed constitution of 1898, 
can be seen in this light.  Their express justification often was to 
ratify existing practices and protect the traditional, natural, God-
ordained order.  Of course, segregation and anti-miscegenation 
laws helped create realities that they were claimed merely to 
protect.  White supremacists wanted such laws precisely because 
white and black Louisianans had been marrying each other, eating 
together, and, crucially, politicking together.  Once stated, the 
point seems obvious.  Yet U.S. Supreme Court decisions like Plessy 
v. Ferguson, which held segregation to be compatible with the 14th 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, rested partly on the 
reasoning that the South’s racist order – in fact being created then 
– was not the least new.11 
 
 
14 
 
Even today it is hard to shake the sense that the disenfranchising 
constitutions of this period were “inevitable” results of white 
racism.12  But white supremacists like Blanchard had to create 
legal and political structures that would “educate” Louisianans to 
that “inevitability.”  Blanchard’s Louisiana Day festivities should 
be seen this light.  In several places, Gramsci made clear that he 
did not limit “law” to statutes passed by legislatures.  Rather the 
“general activity of law” is “wider than purely State and 
governmental activity and also includes activity involved in 
directing civil society, in those zones which the technicians of law 
call legally neutral – i.e., in morality and in custom generally.”13  
Events like Louisiana Day simultaneously presented the newly 
legalized subordination of African-Americans in Louisiana as 
natural, inevitable, progressive, even “humanitarian.” 
 
 
15 
 
Shaping political memories of past events is one way for those who 
control the state to achieve hegemony and secure the social 
conformity, or at least social acquiescence, necessary to sustain 
their rule.  But how can this construct identities?  How can shaping 
the political meanings of events by shaping memories constitute or 
re-constitute political identities?  To explore these questions, let us 
turn to the work of Yuri Lotman. 
 
 
 
 Lotman and Gramsci  
 16  A number of scholars have noted similarities between key concepts  
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developed by Lotman and Bakhtin, on the one hand, and Gramsci 
and Bakhtin, on the other.14  This is not the place for an extended 
comparison of Lotman and Gramsci, yet their theories might be 
more similar to each other than either is to Bakhtin’s.  Lotman was 
a professor of Russian literature at the University of Tartu in 
Estonia, part of the Soviet Union until the last years of his life.  He 
died in 1993.  His work spans literary history and criticism, 
semiotic theory, and information theory.  The semiotics of culture 
focuses his later work, which remains influential.  In the 1960s, 
Lotman’s ideas began to inform work in the West, principally 
among academicians interested in semiotics and Russian 
literature.  This earned him a reputation as “one of the first Soviet 
scholars to become famous abroad.”15 
 
17 
 
Lotman’s work might not be well known to scholars of politics or 
rhetoric, but his intellectual trajectory will be familiar.  Starting 
within a broadly Saussurean framework, Lotman moved in what 
could well be described as a “poststructuralist” direction.16  His 
richly detailed, largely historical, accounts of Russian culture and 
his more abstract elaborations of semiotic theory shift from 
structure to contingency, from synchrony to diachrony, and from 
language or (more narrowly) information-processing to the 
interaction between linguistic and non-linguistic aspects of social 
life.  What Julia Kristeva calls the “subject of enunciation” plays an 
increasing part in Lotman’s theoretical models.  Like Kristeva, 
Lotman described a kind of “sujet-en-process,” whose boundaries 
shift continually and whose internal coherence faces chronic 
contestation.  This subject emerges from a process of engagement 
between “codes” that comprise the self and alternative “codes” 
from beyond the self’s semiotic boundaries. 
 
 
18 
 
In similar ways, Lotman’s work parallels Gramsci’s.  They shared a 
concern with ways that people acquire their “conception of the 
world” in relation to dominant groups.  For Gramsci, people 
always arrive at these conceptions within the context of their larger 
social identities:  “In acquiring one’s conception of the world one 
always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all the 
social elements which share the same mode of thinking and 
activity.”17  Both theorists treated language as central to the 
reproduction of these conceptions.18  Lotman’s work can give 
further texture to Gramsci on hegemony.  It can show how the 
shaping of political memory, as an aspect of hegemony, constitutes 
people’s identities.  To delve deeper into Lotman’s theory, let us 
begin with its account of the role of memory in the production of 
cultural meaning and the self.  Then we can turn to Governor 
 
Marek D. Steedman 84 Poroi, 3, 1, June, 2004 
Blanchard’s politics as a form of what Lotman calls auto-
communication. 
 
 
 Memory and Auto-Communication  
 
19 
 
One of the central themes of Yuri Lotman’s Universe of the Mind is 
that memory is a basic function of all thought.  For Lotman, 
memory is central not only to an individual human being but also 
to texts and cultures, which he sees as “‘thinking’ semiotic 
structures.”19  At this basic level, memory is simply “the capacity to 
preserve and reproduce information (texts).”20  But the third part 
of this volume presents a more complicated account.  In cultural 
terms, memory is a “dialogue” between past and present, not 
merely a mechanism for transmitting information: 
 
 
 
 
Memory is more like a generator, reproducing the past 
again; it is the ability, given certain impulses, to 
switch on the process of generating a conceptualized 
reality which the mind transfers into the past.  . . . The 
interrelationship between cultural memory and its 
self-reflection is like a constant dialogue:  texts from 
chronologically earlier periods are brought into 
culture and, interacting with contemporary 
mechanisms, generate an image of the historical past 
which culture transfers into the past and which, like 
an equal partner in a dialogue, affects the present.21 
 
 
 
 
Memory is an image of the past re-produced in the present that 
gives new shape to the present.  Thus the commemoration of the 
Louisiana Purchase in 1904 explicitly placed the meaning of the 
Purchase in dialogue with the meaning of the Spanish American 
war.  Both acquired new meaning through their juxtaposition and 
dialogue in the context of Louisiana Day. 
 
 
20 
 
Memory is also, then, the product of dialogue.  As such, it involves 
the translation and incorporation of texts from the past into the 
cultural system of the present.  “Texts” from past and present 
transform each other through this translation.  Since the texts 
differ enough to be mutually untranslatable in part, and thus 
asymmetrical in Lotman’s terms, any translation generates 
meaning that is not exactly present before the translation took 
place.  Any text is transformed to some degree when passing into a 
new cultural context, just as the new text transforms that context.  
Insofar as culture is a set of texts, translation becomes “a primary 
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mechanism of consciousness” and a producer of new cultural 
meanings and memories.22 
 
21 
 
At its most straightforward, this translation is the transmission of 
a message from one person (or culture) to another.  One speaker 
transmits a coded message to another, who must “decode” it to 
extract the meaning.  Lotman contrasted this model with auto-
communication, where the sender and receiver are the same 
“person.”  The underlying semantic content of the message 
remains the same in auto-communication, but “recoding” 
transforms its meaning.  Lotman illustrated the concept with the 
example of “diary jottings . . . which are made not in order to 
remember certain things but to elucidate the writer’s inner state, 
something that would not be possible without the jottings.”23  In 
such jottings, “the message is reformulated and acquires new 
meaning;” it is “qualitatively transformed.”24  A parallel 
restructuring occurs in the identity of the diary jotter:  in auto-
communication, “while communicating with himself, the 
addresser inwardly reconstructs his essence, since the essence of a 
personality may be thought of as an individual set of socially 
significant codes, and this set changes during the act of 
communication.”25 
 
 
22 
 
This restructuring happens by “recoding” the original message 
according to a “second code” that rearranges the elements in the 
original message.  This endows those elements, like the message as 
a whole, with new and supplementary meaning.  Imagine that our 
diary jotter is undergoing psychoanalysis.  On returning to his 
diary after a session, he would re-present earlier jottings in light of 
interpretive codes provided by the therapist.  The supplementary 
meaning would result from their restructuring as a new 
mechanism of interpretation rather than some separate addition of 
new informational content to the message.26 
 
 
23 
 
The jottings themselves take on the quality of signs that refer not 
only to their own, original semantic content but also to their 
location within the supplementary code.  These signs can be 
expressed in subsequent jottings by means of shorthand 
comprehensible only if we have access to the secondary code of the 
jotter.  In this way, texts take on meanings that are not simply 
reducible to their informational contents. 
 
 
24 
 
Auto-communication reorganizes the personality of the 
communicator while “raising the rank” of a message yet without 
erasing its previous semantic content.  Like all forms of  
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communication, it depends on memory:  the diary jotter must 
remember the secondary code in order for the supplementary 
meaning of the text to be present.  The meaning of the text, in all 
its complexity, depends on linguistic and non-linguistic contexts 
but also on the ability to reproduce those contexts in subsequent 
re-presentations of the text.  The resulting “dialogue” between the 
jotter’s past and present reshapes both, and therefore the jotter.   
Auto-communication and memory combine to remake aspects of 
his personality. 
 
25 
 
The process occurs also beyond individual consciousness.  In the 
context of Louisiana Day, the storming of government buildings by 
white supremacists in 1874 becomes recoded.  Its meaning [now] 
relates to a larger historical narrative of white imperialism.  For 
Lotman this, too, is an instance of auto-communication.  Indeed 
“culture can be treated both as the sum of the messages circulated 
by various addressers (for each of them the addressee is ‘another,’ 
‘she’ or ‘he’), and as one message transmitted by the collective ‘I’ of 
humanity to itself.  From this point of view, human culture is a vast 
example of autocommunication.”27  Culture thus organizes a 
“collective personality with a common memory and a collective 
consciousness.”28   Below the level of all humanity, particular 
cultures are examples of auto-communication.29 
 
 
26 
 
Lotman’s theory displays memory and meaning-making as deeply 
interdependent.  We can see how the production of new meaning 
entails the production of new memories, just as memory enables 
the generation of meaning.  Lotman specifies a form of 
communication, auto-communication, that actively involves the 
constitution and re-constitution of the communicator’s identity.  
Yet by Lotman’s theory, we need not restrict the “self” to individual 
biological humans.  Instead the “self” can be collective, up to and 
including humanity as a whole.  What remains is to extend this 
theory to politics. 
 
 
 
 Politics as Auto-Communication  
 
27 
 
What might we learn from seeing Governor Blanchard as engaged 
in a political form of auto-communication?30  For Lotman, auto-
communication has three characteristics:  “it does not add to the 
information we already have, but . . . it transforms the self-
understanding of the person who has engendered the text and . . . 
it transfers already existing messages into a new system of 
meanings.”31  We can see immediately that Blanchard’s 
pronouncement added no information to what was available to 
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Louisianans.  Most people would have heard about the Governor’s 
action through newspaper accounts and ensuing word of mouth. 
 
28 
 
Absent some relevant narrative of history, however, neither the 
remarks from Blanchard nor the warm words of the Daily 
Picayune would have given much sense of the import of the 
Governor’s choice.  The tie between September 14, 1904 and 
September 14, 1874 occurs solely through allusion and coded 
references.  Blanchard called the earlier day “justly memorable,” 
and the Picayune termed it a “glorious day in 1874,” yet neither 
related the actual events of the day.  The newspaper came closest, 
but it still talked indirectly of an “immortal act” and a “new birth” 
from “terrible tyranny, darkness and misery.”  In these statements, 
rhetorical flourish is more central than specific information. 
 
 
29 
 
Of course, it was unnecessary for Blanchard or the Daily Picayune 
to go into details.  This was a familiar story to anyone who read 
about Blanchard’s pronouncement.  The rhetoric that cast the 
Democratic return to power as a “Redemption” or “renaissance” of 
the state had been circulating since at least 1877 – if not, in 
anticipation, before.  In Lotman’s words, this is a case of “Let those 
who understand, understand.”32  “Tyranny” and “imposition by a 
sectional Congress” were code words deployed by Democrats and 
white supremacists for the previous forty years of conflict in the 
state and throughout the American South following the Civil War.  
The words conjured a “noble struggle” against tyranny and 
oppression, a struggle conclusively won only through the recent 
institution of racial segregation and the effective disfranchisement 
in Louisiana of people of African descent.  We can see here 
precisely the “reduction of words” that Lotman attributed to auto-
communication:  a small set of words invokes common memories 
complete with associations built over thirty years of telling much 
the same historical narrative. 
 
 
30 
 
Applying Lotman’s analysis suggests that we should not think of 
Blanchard as imparting information, transmitting a message, or 
simply giving new meanings to old events.  His public 
pronouncements and the celebration itself are better seen as forms 
of auto-communication.  They  are parts of an internal dialogue 
that shapes the identity of white-supremacist Louisianans, with 
the Democratic Party as their “leading faction.”  Blanchard 
produced three important effects:  he identified white supremacy 
as a progressive movement; he identified the Democratic Party, as 
the agent of “Redemption,” with the cause of white supremacy; 
and he identified white supremacy itself with the political 
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dominance of elite whites like himself.  Thus Blanchard drew on 
and reshaped a set of political memories to reconstitute the 
“personality” of a white-supremacist Louisiana. 
 
31 
 
The celebration of Louisiana Day within the context of the 
Louisiana Purchase Exposition inserted the “noble struggle” of 
Louisiana Democrats into a broader discourse and historical 
narrative.  The victory of white supremacy in Louisiana became 
part of the general expansion westward of white Americans.  It fed 
into the decimation and subordination of non-whites from the 
Appalachians to the Philippines.  The Exposition presented this 
expansion as progressive and inevitable.  One rationale for 
including displays of Native American and Filipino tribes was 
precisely that anthropologists expected these peoples to die out in 
an “irreconcilable conflict of races.”33 
 
 
32 
 
The ceremonies marking Louisiana Day reinforced these 
connections.  The celebration reenacted the signing of the 
Louisiana Purchase Treaty.  The State of Louisiana commissioned 
a replica of the Cabildo where the treaty was signed.  In this 
building, Governor Blanchard joined representatives from Spain 
and France, as well as ancestors of people present at the first 
signing, to participate in a drama to recreate it.  Before the reading 
and signing came a military parade.  David R. Francis, President of 
the Louisiana Purchase Exposition Company which had organized 
the Fair, wrote that “Brigadier General Rice conducted the 
procession to the Cabildo.  Military features of the parade were 
strengthened by the addition of a detachment of the Jefferson 
Guard, the battalion of Philippine scouts and band, the battalion of 
the Philippine constabulary and band, the United States Marine 
Corps and a battalion of United States troops”34  Soldiers who had 
fought in the Spanish-American War marched with soldiers then 
occupying the Philippines to hail, as Blanchard said, the “new 
birth” of Louisiana from the “tyranny” of racial democracy. 
 
 
33 
 
The Exposition mixed these potent themes with technological 
development and scientific progress.  It commemorated the 
centennial of the Louisiana Purchase by incorporating it into an 
imperialist story of growing domination by the white race over the 
world.  Louisiana Democrats could place their recent history 
within these new coordinates.  White supremacy would not be 
reactionary and conservative; it would be progressive in the 
broadest sense, participating in the dynamism of the new age.  In 
this way, Louisiana Day transformed the identity of white 
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supremacists in Louisiana. 
 
34 
 
At the same time, the celebration presented white Louisiana 
Democrats as central, active figures in Blanchard’s narrative of 
history.  What Lawrence Powell has called the “invented tradition” 
of “September Fourteen” was in fact “largely the symbolic property 
of the silk-stocking classes” in Louisiana.  The tradition affirmed 
not only white supremacy as such, but the assimilation of white 
supremacy to the domination of Louisiana politics by “the silk-
stocking classes.”35  Governor Blanchard was well aware of this.  
His “Inaugural Address” of May 1904 had offered a related 
narrative with a similarly restricted cast of racial “types.”  The 
emphasis was on “self-government,” meaning domination of state 
governance by white men from Louisiana – without interference 
from the federal government. 
 
 
35 
 
This theme of white government appeared in telling terms.  
Blanchard began with the theme of rebirth.  “Louisiana’s political 
renaissance began in the year 1877,” he said, “when the 
government of the state was restored to the hands of the white 
people – the intelligent and property holding classes.”36  1877 
(rather than 1874) was the year when Democrats took full control 
of the state government.  But Blanchard’s theme was the same as 
in his later Louisiana Day pronouncement.  The state had been 
“reborn” by replacing a Republican and racially integrated regime 
with white-supremacist Democrats.  Yet Blanchard did not portray 
all white people in Louisiana as equal participants in the narrative 
of rebirth.  He qualified the phrase “white people” by adding “the 
intelligent and property holding classes.”  These were not so much 
a subcategory of “white people” as a delimitation for what counted 
fully as “white.”  Self-governance meant white supremacy, but the 
governing “self” should be these “white people – the intelligent and 
propertied classes.” 
 
 
36 
 
Blanchard had identified the historic character of Louisiana with a 
specific type, “white people.”  His purpose was not to deny that 
people of color lived in Louisiana but to shape “the negro’s” 
identity and relation to the state.  “To close the door of hope 
against any child within the borders of the State, whatever be his 
race or condition,” said Blanchard as a progressive, “is illogical, 
un-Christian, un-Democratic, and un-American.”37  This might 
sound strange coming from the mouth of a man who resorted to 
violence and fraud to prevent some people from voting on account 
of their race.  “The negro is here,” Blanchard nevertheless 
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affirmed.  “He is a man and a citizen.” 
 
37 
 
Many northern newspapers praised Blanchard for this 
observation, but they paid less attention to the next sentences.  
“He is useful and valuable in his sphere.  Within that sphere he 
must be guaranteed the equal protection of the law, and his 
education along proper lines – mainly agricultural and industrial – 
is at once a duty and a necessity.  He must be protected in his right 
to live peaceably and quietly, in his right to labor and enjoy the 
fruits of his labor.  He must be encouraged to industry and taught 
habits of thrift.”38  Blanchard was saying that the state must 
educate its citizenry; and unlike some in the South, he meant this 
to include “negroes.”  But who were these “negroes?”  As with 
“white people,” Blanchard’s delimitation is telling.  “The negro” 
was definable by his “sphere.”  In this sphere, he was “useful and 
valuable,” presumably to “white people.”  This sphere was “mainly 
agricultural and industrial.”  Ergo “the negro” was a laborer – and 
not “closing the door of hope” meant educating “negroes” to be 
happy laborers. 
 
 
38 
 
To be sure that he wasn’t misunderstood, Blanchard concluded 
with standard fare for white supremacists:  
 
 
 
No approach towards social equality or social 
recognition will ever be tolerated in Louisiana.  
Separate schools, separate churches, separate cars, 
separate places of entertainment will be enforced.  
Racial distinction and integrity must be preserved.  
But there is room enough in this broad Southland, 
with proper lines of limitation and demarcation, for 
the two races to live on terms of mutual trust, mutual 
help, good understanding and concord.  The South 
asserts its ability to handle and solve the negro 
question on humanitarian lines . . .39 
 
 
 
 
“Lines of limitation and demarcation” were central to Blanchard’s 
purpose.  In his inaugural address and his declaration of Louisiana 
Day, Blanchard effectively constituted the boundary, as well as the 
identity, of “Louisiana.”  For Lotman, drawing boundaries is “one 
of the primary mechanisms of semiotic individuation.”  Indeed the 
boundary “can be defined as the outer limit of a first-person 
form.”40  As Lotman makes clear, “The boundary of the personality 
is a semiotic boundary.  For instance, a wife, children, slaves, 
vassals may in some systems be included in the personality of the 
master, patriarch, husband, patron, suzerain, and not possess any 
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individual status of their own; whereas in other systems they are 
treated as separate individuals.”41  Blanchard’s rhetoric operated 
within this logic.  Rather than exclude people of African descent 
from the personality of Louisiana, Blanchard’s rhetoric included 
them – in the form of “the negroes” – as “citizens” within 
Louisiana.  Yet their role was unmistakably subordinate:  “no 
approach to social equality or social recognition” was left open. 
 
39 
 
Relegated to the margins of political significance, the political and 
social gains of African-Americans in the 1870s and after do not 
surface in Blanchard’s categories.  “Negroes” do not include 
politicians, newspaper editors, planters, shopkeepers, or any of the 
other social positions that real African-Americans might have 
occupied in the decades before Blanchard’s words in 1904.42  
Instead he defined “negroes” as members of an agricultural labor 
force, now properly returned to positions of happy subservience. 
 
 
40 
 
Some people, however, were so “marginal” to Blanchard’s 
narrative that they might as well not exist.  As Lotman put it, 
“whole layers of cultural phenomena, which from the point of view 
of the given metalanguage are marginal, will have no relation to 
the idealized portrait of that culture.  They will be declared ‘non-
existent.’”43  “Poor whites” made no appearance in the Louisiana 
narrated by Blanchard.  In the early twentieth century, poor whites 
were marginal politically as well as socially.  The voting restrictions 
embodied in the new Constitution of 1898, aimed primarily at 
black Louisianans, also disenfranchised poor whites.  Louisiana’s 
voting population, of 206,354 in 1896, declined by 1904 to only 
54,222.  Roughly half of the drop was due to the virtual 
disappearance of blacks from the voting rolls after 1898; the rest 
reflected a sharp decline in registration among poor whites.44  As 
voting citizens, therefore, black and lower class Louisianans were 
indeed effectively declared “non-existent.” 
 
 
 
 Center and Periphery  
 
41 
 
Lotman’s semiotics of culture give us a firmer grip on how political 
contestation over the meaning of past events can constitute our 
political identities.  They help us de-code Governor Blanchard’s 
political rhetoric.  Yet they do not guarantee success for strategies 
like Blanchard’s.  Lotman’s account of center and periphery 
clarifies what is at stake. 
 
 
42 
 
Clearly the Blanchard narrative failed to correspond to the 
worldviews or identities of many Louisianans, particularly those of  
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African descent.  Lotman’s conception of center and periphery can 
help us think about their positions in this cultural landscape.  In 
Universe of the Mind, Lotman suggested that a culture’s “self-
description” is continually contested.  “One part of the 
semiosphere,” or cultural space, “in the process of self-description 
creates its own grammar.  . . . Then it strives to extend its norms 
over the whole semiosphere.  A partial grammar of one cultural 
dialect becomes the metalanguage of description for culture as 
such.”45  This extension is never wholly successful.  Even for the 
“center,” with norms that become the standard for the culture as a 
whole, this description is an “idealization.” 
 
43 
 
The farther in cultural terms that people are from the “center,” the 
less its idealized description corresponds to the “semiotic reality 
lying ‘underneath.’”46  On the “periphery,” there is often a large 
gap between the norms or values of the dominant description of 
the culture and the actual practices, norms, or values of those who 
inhabit this cultural location.47  For Lotman, this gap is the 
precondition for “semiotic dynamism.”48  On the periphery, where 
the gap is widest between local activities and central norms, new 
and subversive semiotic practices emerge.  Ultimately the 
periphery bids to become the center of the semiosphere, imposing 
new norms on its predecessors. 
 
 
44 
 
In many ways, the post-Civil War history of Louisiana corresponds 
closely to this pattern.  Governor Blanchard’s “intelligent and 
propertied classes” had successfully imposed their views of 
Louisiana’s history and political culture on the polity as a whole.  
For forty years, Louisianans had struggled over the meanings of 
freedom and citizenship, who should own land and who should 
benefit from cultivating it, and what place people of African 
descent should have in the state and its society.  By 1904, white 
supremacists were the victors.  As Blanchard’s words and deeds 
show, the “center” tried to impose its description of the social 
hierarchy on the state:  blacks were agricultural laborers, whites 
were intelligent and propertied, while whites and blacks could live 
in harmony and happiness if whites solved the race question “on 
humanitarian lines.”  For people murdered, assaulted, or raped by 
these same white supremacists, however, there was a “gap” of 
enormous proportions between this description and their own 
understandings of recent history, especially in their personal lives. 
 
 
45 
 
People of African descent in Louisiana had their own “semiotic 
practices” to subvert those of the white supremacists.  The 
testimony of a former slave, Eliza Pinkston, illustrates this.  She  
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was attacked in her home in north Louisiana in November of 1876, 
when Democrats waged a campaign of terror against black and 
white Republicans.  Her husband and child were killed in the 
attack; Pinkston was raped and left for dead.  Escaping in late 
November to the relative safety of New Orleans, she brought a 
criminal case against two of her attackers.  It was heard in a New 
Orleans municipal police court. 
 
46 
 
Remarkably Pinkston found herself cross-examined in the case by 
John McEnery, the man named Governor by the Democrats during 
their brief coup of September 14, 1874.  One of the men she 
accused was Tom Lyons, a “colored Democrat,” whom she located 
at the murder of her husband.  McEnery asked her whether she 
knew where Lyons lived.  Henry Pinkston, Eliza’s husband, had 
apparently been to Lyons’ house in the past, when Lyons had tried 
to persuade him to join the Democrats.  McEnery asked 
sarcastically, “When colored people visit each other, do they not 
know where each other live, generally?”  She simply responded, “I 
don’t know sir.”  But asked again “whose plantation” Lyons lived 
on, Pinkston shot back, “When colored people visit they never say 
they are on such and such a place, but on a place of their own, but 
that such and such a man has authority.” 
 
 
47 
 
This answer reveals a way black cotton workers subverted the 
naming practices of white people.  Even as they recognized the 
inequalities that shaped plantation life, African-Americans did not 
follow whites in calling a plantation by the name of its white owner 
or occupant, as in “the McEnery Place.”  Black resistance to white 
naming practices had wide ramifications.  The antebellum legal 
system endowed white landowning men with authority as 
household heads – authority that included control over their 
wives, children, slaves and employees.  White men’s naming 
practices revealed that, even after slaves had been emancipated, 
landowning white men still saw a social landscape shaped by the 
antebellum legal system.  A white man like John McEnery 
continued to emphasize his control over the land, yet black 
sharecroppers like Eliza Pinkston had come to see their homes as 
“their own.”49 
 
 
48 
 
There were alternative, if not always subversive, semiotic practices 
on the “periphery.”  In 1904, these did not provide resources 
sufficient for a challenge to the supremacy of the dominant 
political discourse, but Lotman’s account suggests that this is 
always a live possibility.  When Pinkston brought her court case, in 
1877, ensuing years of struggle were not guaranteed to end in 
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disfranchisement and segregation.  Nevertheless it had become 
clear by 1904 that black Louisianans would face radically limited 
opportunities for producing their own public discourse, let alone 
challenging that of white Democrats.50  Lotman did not imply that 
every move from the periphery would succeed; indeed his account 
connects with Gramsci’s in describing a form of power where 
semiotic mechanisms can help the center maintain its position.  
Thus we can think of Governor Blanchard as exercising power to 
maintain the position of silk-stocking white supremacy as the 
center of Louisiana’s political culture by fending off incipient 
cultural rebellions from black and poor-white Louisianans on the 
periphery. 
 
 
 
Conclusion: 
Hegemony and Auto-Communication  
 
49 
 
Neils Helsloot has argued that “linguists study, often on too 
abstract a level, the way social groups are ‘articulated’ by language 
practices.  Alternatively, they could take up organizing/dispersing 
practices, struggles for schism and alliance, as part of the way in 
which human individuals form their lives (their 
identities/differences) through language.” Helsloot has urged that 
we attend to the ways in which language constructs identity and 
difference in one and the same move.  Linguistic or semiotic 
strategies aimed at consolidating a particular identity aim 
simultaneously at dispersing alternative forms of identification.  
Helsloot has meant his remarks to correct, through a link to 
Volosinov (Bakhtin), what he has seen as an excessive emphasis in 
Gramsci on the need to achieve a “totalizing and all absorbing 
unity.”51  I have used Gramsci and Lotman to explain how white 
supremacists went about achieving unity, in part by marginalizing 
and dispersing alternative identities.  In combination, the two can 
help us trace such dynamics. 
 
 
50 
 
A number of striking similarities in the two theories make their 
combination attractive.  Particularly intriguing is the resonance 
between Lotman’s relationship of center to periphery and 
Gramsci’s dialectic of hegemonic and subaltern groups.  For both 
Lotman and Gramsci, communication takes place in the context of 
structural asymmetry.  Gramsci’s framework corresponds class 
identities to specific locations in a system of production, but this 
resembles Lotman’s view that people acquire and develop a 
cultural “grammar” within the context of a (possibly more 
complex) terrain of cultural identities and practices.52  Gramsci, 
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like Lotman, described a process of competition among groups 
that seek to impose their conceptions on others.  Their struggles 
shape individual consciousness and “collective consciousness” for 
the people involved.  For Gramsci, “critical understanding of self 
takes place therefore through a struggle of political ‘hegemonies’ 
and of opposing directions.”53  As for Lotman, the struggle is over 
which group can impose its “idealization” on the whole society. 
 
51 
 
For both theorists, this imposition implies a gap, or at least 
potential for one, between the conceptions of the dominant group 
and the peripheral or subaltern groups.  According to Lotman, the 
“grammar” that comes to dominate the semiosphere is an 
“idealization,” even an “illusion.”54  As we approach the periphery, 
it is increasingly so, though the idealization structures real social 
relations.  According to Lotman, it is nonetheless from the 
periphery that new cultural productions, new meanings, arise.  
Similarly the Communist Party operated for Gramsci precisely in 
the gap between the worldviews generated in a civil society 
dominated by capitalist interests and the new forces emerging 
among the working classes.  Success by the Communist Party in 
organizing a collective will among workers would be the 
precondition for a general restructuring of society.  The 
Communist Party would be a “myth-prince,” waging an ideological 
battle.  Still to the extent that it could reorganize the world in its 
own image, the Party also could reshape social relations. 
 
 
52 
 
Here is one source of dispersal, of the unity of the center, through 
challenges arising in the periphery.  In Blanchard’s Louisiana, as 
we have seen, these contests were muted.  To mount an effective 
challenge to white supremacy in Louisiana would have entailed a 
solid alliance between African Americans and poor whites, but 
white Democrats had defeated just such an alliance in the previous 
decade. 
 
 
53 
 
The success of white Democrats itself depended on another 
mechanism of dispersal identified by Lotman.  The boundary is, 
for Lotman, the basic mechanism of individuation.  It is easy to 
think of this in terms of Hegel’s familiar claim that identities are 
always formed, in part, with reference to some Other, external to 
the self.  But the boundaries that Blanchard drew also had the 
effect of actively dispersing alternative ways in which Louisianans 
might have thought about identity.  Rather than alliances based on 
class, religious, or linguistic differences (to mention three 
possibilities salient in Louisiana), Blanchard’s semiotic practices 
combined with legal, economic, and violent forms of intimidation 
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to solidify race as the relevant form of identification. 
 
54 
 
As Andreas Schönle has argued, then, Lotman did provide a 
“semiotic theory of social power.”55  In contrast to Gramsci, 
Lotman focused neither on the state nor on how ruling classes 
secure consent to their rule.  Nor did he attend to the relation 
between cultural economic or political forms of power.  But the 
similarities may be more important than the differences.  The 
shared emphasis on asymmetrical communication, on language or 
culture as a site of power, and on struggles for hegemony within 
the domain of culture can sustain an approach drawing from both 
theorists.  While each depart[s] from the structuralist orthodoxy of 
their predecessors, both retain a robust sense of structure in their 
accounts of culture, politics, and economics.   Moreover they 
presume some form of underlying coherence as necessary for 
meaningful communication to take place.  For Gramsci, this is a 
political achievement, the result of hegemony rather than its 
precondition; for Lotman, such a conception of the semiosphere is 
susceptible to naturalization.56  [But, broadly, these commitments] 
connect Gramsci and Lotman more closely to each other than to 
Bahktin. 
 
 
55 
 
In combination, each can be used to overcome limitations of the 
other.  Where Lotman’s semiotic theory risks presenting power as 
a relation among “texts,” Gramsci’s political theory attends to who 
is producing those texts with what political agendas.  Where 
Gramsci showed how some dynamics generate cohesion, Lotman 
explored how related dynamics disrupted it.  Where Lotman’s 
account might focus too exclusively on culture, Gramsci’s can 
remind us of connections among culture, economy, and polity.  
And where Gramsci’s concept of hegemony seems to imply that 
identities are shaped through contestation over “worldviews,” 
Lotman’s semiotics can give us a more precise account of how this 
happens. 
 
 
56 
 
Drawing on this combination, we can see how leaders like 
Blanchard deployed diverse resources – legal and political, 
semiotic and extra-semiotic – to reshape Southern conceptions of 
citizenship.  Blanchard and company had come to control these 
resources largely through force and fraud.  As Gramsci and 
Lotman suggest, however, the Southerners used these resources to 
reconfigure the relationships between the state and its citizens, 
black and white.  They justified their exercise of state power as the 
protection of an established white supremacy that they were in the 
process of creating.  And they structured the social landscape 
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around racial identification.  Leaders like Blanchard achieved each 
of these steps, in part, through semiotic state practices that 
reconceived the relationships between the rulers and the ruled 
while giving those relationships concrete forms. 
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